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CHAPTER 1 — EXPENDITURE ON LOCAL ROADS 
1.1 Introduction 
. Since 1945, expenditure on roads has constituted the largest form 
of capital works expenditure . in . Australia. 	In 1980/81 road expenditure 
exceeded $2.1 billion, equivalent to about twenty five per cent of total 
capital expenditure by all public authorities. 	Expenditure on roads was far 
in_excess . of . capital spending in such areas as education, health, or power. 
Expenditure on local roads in Australia in 1980/81 amounted to $347 million. 
, 	Until the mid 1960's there was little attention paid to the economic efficiency of this substantial investment. While Commonwealth 
monies for the road system were allocated on a number of different bases, none 
were predicated on a desire to ensure efficient allocation of resources. 
Following the establishment of the Commonwealth Bureau of Roads (C.B.R.) a 
more conscious attempt was made to impose a measure of economic rationality 
into expenditure on roads. 
. The C.B.R. were charged with advising the Commonwealth Government 
on the appropriate level of road investment consistent with the overall 
national . interest.. The reports of . the.C.B.R..and its successor, the Bureau 
of Transport Economics (BTE), have provided successive Commonwealth 
Governments with a basis upon which to allocate monies for expenditure on 
roads in Australia to this day. 
A consistent feature of the pattern of expenditure on roads has 
been that local road expenditure has been at a level that is higher than that 
iustified by normative economic analyses using C.R.R. 	This dissertation will 
investigate the levels of expenditure on local roads and attempt to draw some 
conclusions on the way monies are allocated to this category of road by both 
State and Commonwealth Governments and also of-the demand-for local roads by 
the ratepayers of the municipalities. 
The quantitative part of the investigation will be confined to 
Tasmania's local roads. 	In part, this is to make the problem more tractable, 
but it also allows the Author to use information supplied by the, Department of 
Main Roads to assist in overcoming particular local anomalies. 
1.2 Alm of this Dissertation 
The economic analysis of the CBI?. relied on a cost benefit analysis. 
A large scale survey of the Australian road network was undertaken to . 
determine physical deficiencies in the road system. 	Some 80,000 road 
construction projects were identified as being necessary for the improvement 
of the system and some 50,000 of these were subjected to economic analysis. 
While the emphasis of these studies conducted. in 1968, 1973, 1975 
and 1979 were normative, there has been little examination of the behaviour of 
States and local government on a positive basis, that is, examining what they 
do rather than what they ought to do. 
... : . ... . . • 	.•.,:•:•.• 
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One of the limitations of cost benefit analysis is the acceptance 
(at least in its normal application) of the income distribution and the lack 
of evaluation of the distributive effects of the benefits. 	Clearly, the 
large capital expenditures on roadworks have the potential to have significant 
distributive effects and this is likely to be an influential factor in the 
distribution of road funds. 
The aim of this dissertation is to investigate the demand for local 
government roads. 	There are a number of difficulties involved in this 
investigation and these are common to measuring the demand for other outputs 
of government.. Conventional demand theory estimates the demand for a good 
using a . readily . definable . output measure in terms of relevant economic 
variables such as the price of the goods and income of the purchaser. 
The most difficult problem in measuring the demand for local government roads 
Is that . there . is . no readily defined market in which consumers may purchase the 
output of government roads. 
Accordingly, an attempt will be made to estimate the demand for 
local roads by the ratepayers of that municipality through a model of the 
political process. 	The model must take into account the effect on the local 
government electorate of the intergovernment grants which are made to assist 
the municipality. 	These grants will have the effect of expanding output 
beyond the level which the electorate would demand if it were the sole source 
of funding. 
It is hoped that the model that will be developed will provide an 
estimate of the demand for local roads in terms of the cost of their 
provision. 	The author has been unable to find any work on this topic 
undertaken in Australia using this form of model. 	Further, the model itself 
breaks new ground in one aspect of its development in providing a means of 
combining the different forms of grant provided by State and Commonwealth 
Government. 
1.3 The Median Voter Model 
The expenditure on roads by local authorities in Tasmania is a 
significant component of total expenditure. 	In twenty four of the forty nine 
municipalities, expenditure in 1.981 on roads accounted for more than half of 
the total municipal expenditure. 	In these municipalities no other single 
important item of services is provided by the municipality. 
The expenditure of local authorities will be examined using a model 
based upon the political process. 	The underlying assumption is that the 
economic welfare of the electorate is inextricably linked with the voting 
behaviour of the electorate. 	The public choice model that will be developed 
assumes that the level of road expenditure is effectively decided at the 
ballot box with the electorate casting their votes based on the benefits they 
expect to receive for a given level of taxation. 	The munictpal. councillors 
that are elected will have a combined platform that is closest to the desires 
of the majority of the electorate. 
If everyone had the same individual preferences there would be 
unanimity over the level of public expenditure. 	However, as the level of 
expenditure and of taxation has different effects on the income of each voter, 
preferred levels . of . expenditure differ. 	Within certain constraints it can be 
shown that the outcome of an election will he decided by the median voter and 
that the candidate elected will most closely represent his preferences. 
. A number of obvious issues need to be addressed before this simple . 
conceptual . model . may . be translated into a working model suitable for empirical 
work. 	These include the shape of voter preferences, voter abstention, 
multiple Issues, voter information including fiscal illusion and the effect of 
intergovernmental grants. 	There are also inherent problems in measuring the 
output of local government as, for many goods and services including roads, no 
satisfactory physical measure can be found. 
1.4 Arrangement of Dissertation 
The Dissertation consists of seven chapters. 	Chapters two and 
three discuss how each level of government is responsible for the local 
authority road network . and . the contribution each makes to its funding.. The 
fourth chapter develops the demand model for Local Government roads. 	The 
fifth chapter will describe the data to be used in the model and present the 
results of the estimation. 	The sixth chapter will discuss the results of the 
model estimations and effect of the many assumptions inherent in the model on 
the results obtained. 	The final chapter will summarise the issues raised in 
the dissertation and attempt to reconcile these with the results obtained from 
the model estimations. 
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CHAPTER 2 : THE ROAD TASK OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN TASMANIA 
2.1 Responsibility of Government for Roads 
Under the Australian Constitution, it is the States who have the primary 
responsibility for roads. 	However, since 1922, the Commonwealth, acting 
through Section 96 of the Constitution, has made available grants for the 
express purpose of constructing roads. 	Similarly, local government 
authorities in each of the States have been delegated much of the direct 
responsibility for the network of local roads. 
After Federation, each State set up Roads Boards that determined which 
roads would be the responsibility of the State Government, coordinated a 
strategy for the development of roads, and arranged with local government a 
system of disbursing assistance for local roads in an equitable manner. 
In Tasmania a road hierarchy was established of Highways, Main Roads, 
Secondary Roads, Tourist Roads, Developmental Roads and Subsidised Roads. 
All other roads were to be the complete responsibility of local government. 
In return, the local councils received an allocation of funds for maintenance 
and construction of roads. 	In Australfa as a whole, arterial roads 
equivalent to State Highways and Main Roads in the Tasmanian classification 
system, comprise less than 15% of the total road network while carrying 70% of 
the total traffic flow. 	In Tasmania there is insufficient data on vehicle 
usage to derive comparable statistics. 	However, of the 19,369 km of roads in 
Tasmania, 15,670 km or 80.9% are local roads. 
2.2 Responsibilities of the Commonwealth Government 
The Commonwealth has, since 1922, assisted the States by making grants 
for roadworks. 	The present method by which grants are determined has its 
origins in the Commonwealth Aid Roads Act (1964). 	This Act established the 
Commonwealth Bureau of Roads (C.B.R.) whose function was to determine the 
extent of road needs in Australia and to assist the Commonwealth Government in 
the consideration of grants of financial assistance to the States. 
From 1931 to 1959, Commonwealth funding of road construction was based 
on fuel tax revenues. 	The distribution between mainland States was on the 
basis of area (2/5) and population with Tasmania receiving 5% of the total 
allocation. 	From 1960 onwards the relationship between fuel tax and road 
grants was severed and until 1969 the mainland States were given grants based 
on area (1/3), number of motor vehicles (1/3) and population (1/3), with 
Tasmania again receiving 5% of the total allocation. 
In 1964 the Commonwealth Bureau of Roads Act established the C.B.R. who 
were to be responsible for determining a level of expenditure based on 
national economic interest. 	The Bureau made its first report in 1968. 
This, together with successive reports made in 1973 and 1975, and by the 
Bureau of Transport Economics in 1979, has been the basis for Commonwealth 
road allocation since 1969. 
10 
Commonwealth road grants have been distributed to the States through a 
succession of Roads Grant Act typically on a triennial basis. 	The most 
recent legislation has been the (Commonwealth) Roads Grant Act (1983). 
The Commonwealth maintains direct control only of National Roads. 
These were established in the 1974 National Roads Act. 	At the local level, 
the States are given the option of submitting detailed programs of local 
roadworks or a program outlining expenditure to be taken by State and local 
government in either of the two local roads categories. 	Commonwealth grants 
are . offered on . a . quota basis. 	The States are required to match the 
Commonwealth grant . with . a . minimum . level of funding. 	This ensures that 
Commonwealth road grants are not used as . a means to allow States to spend 
their road funds on other goods or .services. 
..... 
 
The Commonwealth recognises the role of local government by directing a 
prpportion . of . funds directly to local government, although the allocation of 
funds to individual municipalities is the responsibility of State governments. 
The Commonwealth has its own road classification system which is used 
for fund allocation. 	However, the State Government which allocates both 
State and Commonwealth grants jointly, uses the State system as the basis of 
its allocative process. 	The basis of State allocation is described in 
Section 3.3. 
2.3 The role of the State Government 
The Department of Main Roads is the State Road Authority in Tasmania. 
It has the responsibility for advising the Government which roads shall be 
classified and thus accepted as being the responsibility of the State. 	The 
State is also able to submit some of its roads for inclusion in the National 
Roads Program set up under the National Roads . Act . (1974). . As well as 
National . Highways . linking the principal population centres, Hobart, 
Launceston, Devonport and Burnie, this program has also included as a National 
Commerce Road the highway between Launceston and the port of Bell Bay. 
The State Road network has changed relatively little in recent years and 
many classified roads carry little traffic. 	This may be seen partly as a 
subsidy to more rural areas in that the road network of local government is 
reduced. 	There are more overt subsidies in the form of Developmental and 
Subsidised Roads. 	Most Developmental Roads are located on the West Coast and 
link mining developments with the State Road system. 	Subsidised Roads are 
municipal roads which are maintained at the expense of the State Government. 
The longest of these, Coles Ray Road, was classified by the Department of Main 
Roads in 1983. 
Since the State has the primary responsibility for roads and the 
technical resources with which to manage them, the Department of Main Roads 
has the responsibility for allocating Commonwealth and State grants for roads 
to the municipalities. 	The Department also oversees the construction of 
local roads and is able to offer technical assistance to local authorities. 
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2.4 The Structure and Responsibilities of Local Government in Tasmania 
The Structure of Local Government in Tasmania was reorganised in 1906 
into its present form. 	Under the Local Government Act (1906) the 
administration of local government duties was to be undertaken by districts of 
which there were to be no more than sixty. A Commission, set up under the 
Act, recommended that there be 50 divisions together with the two existing 
cities of Hobart and Launceston. 
Subsequently, 3 municipalities were amalgamated with neighbouring Cities 
and two municipalities were proclaimed as Cities - Glenorchy and Devonport. 
The 1906 Act was replaced by the Local Government Act (1962) which 
consolidated this and other legislation into the one Act. The two Cities, 
Hobart and Launceston, still operate under separate Acts of Corporation while 
Devonport and Glenorchy remain under the Local Government Act. 
The municipalities are run by municipal councils. These may consist of 
six, nine, twelve or fifteen councillors depending on the size of 
municipality. The principal office bearers, Warden, Deputy Warden and 
Treasurer, are elected by the Council. 	Those eligible to vote in Council 
elections are owners or occupiers of rateable land who must be British 
subjects. 	There is also a separate category of residence electors who must 
have lived in the electorate six months and be enrolled as an elector for the 
State Legislative Council or House of Assembly. The term of office-for each 
Councillor is three years with one third of the Council retiring each year. 
The Minister administering the Local Government Act may, for a number of 
reasons, suspend the elected Council. 	Most usually this occurs following a 
petition of ratepayers and a poll of municipal electors. 	In the past five 
years two Councils have been run by Ministerially appointed Commissions. 
These were Zeehan on the west coast of Tasmania and Lilydale near Launceston, 
from 1982. 
The functions of the municipalities are set out in the Local Government 
Act Section 176. 
"A Municipality (a) may make for the welfare and government 
of its district and the inhabitants thereof 
i) make by-laws 
ii) undertake, make and maintain works, buildings and 
services 
iii) order and dispose the common affairs of its members 
and, (b) shall cause the Queen's peace to be kept and 
maintained within its districts." 
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The municipalities are responsible for determining which road projects 
they require to be undertaken and for their planning, design, and 
construction. 	The municipalities are also responsible for raising funds for 
roadworks by a combination of levying rates and gaining assistance from the 
State Government. The municipal council has the task of balancing local 
priorities for roadworks against the level of rates imposed on the municipal 
electorate. 
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CHAPTER 3 — FINANCE FOR LOCAL GOVERNMENT WORKS 
3.1 Sources of Local Government Finance 
Local government derives the funds it requires to carry out capital 
works from three sources. 	It may levy rates on the owners of property 
located within the municipality. The municipality may receive capital grants 
from either State or Commonwealth Governments. Finally, the municipality may 
apply to the State Government for loan funds for certain approved classes of 
projects. 
In Tasmania, local roads receive funds from all three of the sources 
outlined above. The following sections will consider the mechanisms by which 
Tasmanian municipalities derive funds from each of these sources. 
3.2 Municipal Rates 
Under the Local Government Act (1962), municipal councils are authorised 
to levy rates based on the assessed annual value of the property, the capital 
value of the property, or a combination of the two. 	The assessed annual 
value is the annual income that the landowner could obtain by letting the land 
and any fixtures upon it to a tenant. The capital value is the value of the 
land together with any improvements. Valuations are carried out by the Land 
Valuation Branch of the Lands Department. Each municipality is completely 
valued in a single year and revaluations take place at five year intervals. 
In most Tasmanian municipalities the rate is broken into specific 
categories of expenditure. 	In the case of local roads, almost all 
municipalties establish a Road Rate Account which receives rate income 
dedicated to road works. 	A number of municipalities strike separate rates 
for different categories of expenditure so that ratepayers can identify 
exactly how much they are paying for roads, water supply, sewerage and other 
goods and services provided by other municipalities. 	In other municipalities 
the council advise ratepayers of the proportion of rates allocated to the 
services provided by the municipality. 
The Road Rate Account is used to pay road maintenance, engineering and 
supervision costs, materials, plant hire and any Council contribution to any 
intergovernmental matching grants. 	A study of municipal accounts published 
in the Tasmanian Government Gazette showed that none of the municipalities 
that had established Road Rate Accounts had transferred monies from that 
account to other municipal accounts apart from those strictly relating to 
roads. 	No municipality had transferred monies from other rate accounts for 
use on local government roads. 
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The use of separate rate accounts for each category of municipal
expenditure is employed mainly by the smaller municipalities where the full 
range of municipal services are not provided to all ratepayers, for example, 
sewerage or water. 	In the larger municipalities, ratepayers are provided 
with a breakdown of overall municipal expenditures into particular categories. 
. 	...... 3.3 Intergovernmental Contribution to Local Authorities for Roadworks 
Under the Commonwealth Roads . Acts . the Commonwealth disburses grants for 
local government roadworks. 	These grants are then passed on to local 
authorities through the State Road Authorities. 
.States are given the option of submitting to the Commonwealth detailed 
programs of works or a program outlining expenditure to be undertaken by State 
and local government authorities on urban and rural local roads. 
In . Tasmania,.these Commonwealth grants are allocated in different ways 
depending on whether they are urban or rural local roads. 	Urban road grants 
are allocated to municipalities and cities in the Hobart and Launceston 
statistical divisions. 	For the Hobart division, this includes the cities of 
Hobart and Glenorchy and the municipalities of Clarence, Sorell, Ringborough 
and Brighton and the Launceston division includes the city of Launceston and . 
all or parts . of . the municipalities of Si. Leonards, Beaconsfield, George Town, 
Lilydale, Evendale and Longford. 	Rural local road grants are allocated to 
other municipalities in Tasmania. 
The disbursement of urban local road grants is detailed in Figure 3.1. 
Commonwealth and State funds are pooled together and allocated jointly. 
Rural local grants are allocated on a different basis. 	One third of 
Commonwealth grants is allocated to the Department of Main Roads. Three 
quarters of this is spent on bridges on rural local roads. 	Under the State 
Roads and Jetties Act the Department of Main Roads is responsible for all 
expenditure on bridges and culverts greater than $140. 	The remaining 25% is 
spent on classified rural local roads. 
The two-thirds of.Commonwealth grants allocated to local authorities is 
divided into maintenance and construction. 	The division between the two 
categories has been varied from time to time. Up until. 1981, maintenance was 
allocated on the basis of a formula, 50% in proportion to road length, 25% in 
proportion to population and 25% to the five year average of the road rate 
levy. 	In 1979/80 the maintenance grant made up 30% of the allocation to 
local authorities. 	The remainder is allocated on a needs basis. 	Councils 
are required to submit programs of road projects to the Department of Main 
Roads. 	The Department then allocates road funds on a priority basis. 
The allocation of rural local road grants is shown on Fig. 3.2. 
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TABLE 3.1 Allocation of Urban Local Road Grant in Tasmania 
(1979-80) 
Commonwealth Grant - State Funds 
4% Administration 98% Distribution to Councils 
‘NN 
67% Hobart Councils 
allocated on needs 
basis 
33% Launceston 
Councils on 
needs basis 
Source: ACIR (1981) 
33% Department of 
Main Roads 
67% Local 
Authorities 
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TABLE 3.2 Allocation of Rural Local Road Grant in Tasmania 
(1979-80) 
Commonwealth Grant. 
75 per cent 
Bridges on 
rural local 
roads 
25 per cent 
Cl assi fied 
rural local 
roads 
30% Maintenance 
Allocated on a 
needs basis 
70% Construction 
Allocated on a 
needs basis 
NOTE: Maintenance grant was allocated according to the following 
formula:- 
50% allocated in proportion to road length 
25% allocated in proportion to population 
25% allocated in proportion to the five year average 
of the Road Rate Levy 
Source: ACIR (1981) 
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3.4 Intergovernmental Grants for Other Goods and Services 
The disbursement of State and Commonwealth Grants to local authorities 
for goods and services other than roads is controlled by the State Grants 
Commission Act 1976. 	This established the State Grants Commission whose role 
as defined by Section 9 (2) (d) of the Act is to recommend grants to local 
authorities in such a way that 
'the Commission shall ensure that as far as possible that amount is 
sufficient.to . enable the municipality by reasonable effort, to function at a 
standard not appreciablybelow . that . of other municipalities, that in the 
opinion of the Commission are similar...'. 
The Commission is, moreover, required by the Local Government (Personal 
Income Tax Sharing) Act 1976, a Commonwealth Act, to 
'allocate not less than 30 per cent of the amount to which it is 
entitled ... amongst local governing bodies in the State on a population 
basis' (Section 6 (2) (a) ). 
The Commission has chosen not to allocate funds so as to equalise 
standard and then deduct the 30% population component, but rather to allocate 
30% according to population and divide the remaining 70% on a basis of 
equalisation between municipalities (State Grants Commission Annual Report 
(1978). 
The grant required to compensate municipalites for their revenue 
disabilities is determined by measuring the relative revenue per capita yield 
of a uniform rate of tax. 	Councils' rates are based on assessed annual 
values. 	Each municipality is revalued at one time, every five years. 	An 
index of relative rateable capacity is made based on an assessment by the 
Valuer General of land-price movements since the last valuation and 
discounting for such factors as differing social, economic and physical 
characteristics. 	These factors include, for example, the number of 
pensioners, adverse seasonal conditions, or if a major industry has suffered a 
setback. ( S.G.C. Annual Report (1978).) 
Section 9 (2) (d) of the Act (1976) both requires that there should be 
'reasonable effort' in revenue raising and that the municipality should 
'function at a standard not appreciably below that of other municipalities'... 
Accordingly, the Commission has established six expenditure categories - 
administration, roads, debt charges, health and welfare services, services for 
non-residents and other unclassified expenditure. 	Expenditure is analysed so 
as to identify differences in unit costs. 
The Commission then puts together the results of its assessment of the 
costs and revenues of the municipalities and adds up the separate adjustments. 
The total disability on the expenditure and the appropriate revenue adjustment 
gives the assessed grant for each municipality. 	The assessed grant is then 
compared with grants to other municipalities of similar characteristics and 
also to the grant given to the municipality in the previous year. Account is 
also taken of other grants given by Government for local government services 
such as roads, water and sewerage. 	Accordingly; it may be taken that road 
grants and State Grants grants are decided simultaneously. 
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CHAPTER 4 : A THEORETICAL MODEL FOR LOCAL GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE ON ROADWORKS 
4.1 Introduction 
In the introductory chapter it was noted that most economic assessment 
of road investment in Australia had been centred around the use of cost 
benefit analysis. 	This was the basis used for determining the optimal 
allocation of funds in the three reports of the Commonwealth Bureau of Roads 
(C.B.R.. 1968,1973,1975) and subsequently by the Bureau of Transport Economics 
(B.T.E., 1979). 
This dissertation examines local road expenditure from the point of view 
of the voter who is seen as the purchaser of road services. 	In the previous 
chapter the methods of financing local road expenditure were noted in Sections 
3.2 and 3.3. 	The magnitude of road investment at least makes it implicityly 
a significant electoral issue in all Tasmanian municipalities, and in twenty 
four of the forty nine municipalities expenditure on local roads accounts for 
more than half the total municipal expenditure. 	Moreover, in these latter 
municipalities no other single important item of services is provided by the 
council. 
The public choice model developed in this chapter assumes that the level 
of local road expenditure is decided at the municipal ballot box and views 
public choice as the outcome of majority voting, where voting is a procedure 
for arriving at a collective decision when voters have different tastes or 
endowments and where their individual preferences on fiscal policies are 
likely to differ. 
4.2 The Voting Model 
The development of models describing public choice has a long history 
beginning with Hotelling (1929). 	The models are all predicated on the 
assumption that both voters and their prospective representatives will act in 
a rational manner by attempting to maximise their respective utilities. 	For 
the voter, this means the maximisation of benefits in terms of goods and 
services provided by the municipality for a given cost. 	The councillors, on 
the other hand, are assumed in the words of Downs (1957) - 
"to formulate policies in order to win elections rather 
than win elections to formulate policies" 
In the model that will be developed in this chapter the voter is assumed 
to cast his vote for the benefit that he will receive from a given output of 
goods which he will pay for from taxes. 	The level of utility of the voter 
will depend only on his disposable income and the level of spending on 
municipal goods. 	The municipal councillors that are elected will have a 
combined platform that is closest to the desires of the majority of the 
electorate. 
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Figure 4.1.a shows the individual decision process. 	An individual has 
a certain income which is shown in the diagram as his private goods. 	The 
locus of all possible combinations of his expenditure on private and public 
goods is his budget line, AR in the diagram. 	The individual voter maximises 
his utility at some combination of public and private goods at public good 
output G. 	in figure 4.1.b this is represented as the maximum utility that he 
can obtain for his given budget. 
If everyone had the same preferences as the individual in the diagram, 
then there would be unanimity over the level of public expenditure. The 
dashed lines in Figure 4.1.b show alternative preferences held by other 
members of the electorate. 	Since there can only be one decision which in the 
case of municipal elections is decided by a simple majority, the combination 
of preferences adopted by the candidate will be those of the decisive voter, 
the median voter. The median moter model in its simplest form above assumes 
that the policies offered to the electorate by candidates lie upon a single 
dimension. 	Each voter is assumed to have a preferred position along this 
dimension and the further that the policies of a candidate differ from this 
position the less desirable would be his election to the voter. 
The simple frequency distribution, of voter preferences, shown in Figure 
4.2.a will be faced by candidates who must adopt strategies to maximise their 
chances of election. 	If every voter votes and has the choice of voting for 
one of two candidates L and R then all those voters with a preferred position 
to the left of X , the mid point between the candidates will vote for 
candidate L while those to the right of X will vote for candidate R. 	If 
there are more voters with preferences to the right of X then candidate R 
wins. 	However, candidate L could increase his share of the vote by moving 
his platform toward R shifting X. to the right. 	Similarly, candidate R can 
move his position toward L. 	As elections are decided by the median voter, 
candidates aim to ensure that as many voters as possible have preferences on 
their side of the mid point between the candidates. Roth candidates are thus 
driven to the position favoured by the median voter. 
This model of voter behaviour was put forward by Hotel ling as the 
rational outcome of two party democracy. 	The model was further developed in 
Down's major work "An Fconomic Theory of Democracy". 	The median voter model 
makes strong predictions, but at the expense of some heroic assumptions. 
Subsequent writers have sought to relax these assumptions. 
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4.3 Assumptions Implicit in the Median Voting Model 
The first assumption to he relaxed is to consider an alternative 
distribution of preferences. 	Tt can clearly be seen from Figure 4.2.b that 
whatever the shape of the distribution of preferences, as long as all voters 
vote, the voters lying between a candidate's position and the tail of the 
distribution must vote for that candidate. 	As Black (1958) points out, the 
likely unimodal distribution will be a single peaked plateau. A candidate 
can optimise his vote by moving toward the median and taking votes from the 
other candidate. 	A similar strategy operates for the other candidate so the 
logical strategy for all candidates is to aim to represent the median voter. 
The next step in the consideration of the median voter model is to 
consider voter abstention. 	A prominent feature of Tasmanian municipal 
elections is the low level of participation by the electorate. Voter 
abstention may be due to the policy positions of candidates being too close to 
each other, causing indifference in the electorate or being too far away, 
causing alienation. 	As Mueller (1979) states 
"If the probability that a voter does not vote is an 
increasing function of the closeness of candidates' 
position a movement toward the centre of a symmetric 
distribution of preferences has a symmetric effect on 
the candidate vote totals. 	The pull of the median 
remains and the equilibrium is again at the median. 
Indifference does not affect this result". 
Similarly, a candidate is pulled toward the median of the distribution 
of policies if the probability of voter abstention through alienation is an 
increasing function of the distance of a candidate's policy from that of the 
voter. 
Thus, voter abstention, either through indifference or alienation or a 
combination of both, will not affect the tendency of candidates to tailor 
their policy toward that of the median voter. 
The next assumption that must be considered is the distribution of voter 
preferences for particular policies. 	Stokes (1963) challenged the model 
proposed by nowns by questioning the continuous distribution of preferences. 
Figure 4.2.c shows a distribution which is discontinuous. This could easily 
arise on issues where public opinion is sufficiently polarised, for example, 
abortion or nuclear disarmament. 	In this case, the effect of alienation to 
one part of the electorate would predominate and this would force candidates 
to take a policy toward one of the two modes. 	In this dissertation, the 
municipal good under consideration - roads - is considered to have a 
continuous distribution and it is thought likely that the mode and the median 
are sufficiently close for the assumption that the median voter is the 
decisive voter to be tenable. 
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A more difficult assumption inherent in the model is that of 
considering elections to be about the one issue that becomes the concern of 
all of the electorate. 	Clearly, most local government elections are over a 
wide range of issues, though the number and complexity of these issues is 
relatively constrained compared to State and Commonwealth elections. 
However, the presence of a number of issues with the consequent multi-
dimensional distribution of voter preferences combined with the presence of 
voter alienation may lead, to the possibility of a candidate presenting a 
policy platform of extreme positions where the support of minorities is in 
sufficient number to defeat another candidate who adopts a median position on 
all. 	The voters who hold extreme views on particular issues are trading off 
votes on other issues to support particular views. 	This can lead to cyclical 
voting which in a two candidate system would show itself as the continual 
defeat of the incumbent. 
The problem of a multi modal distribution of voter preferences is 
theoretically difficult to overcome. 	At a local government level, two 
factors point to the strength of the median voter model. 	The first is that, 
in over half the Tasmanian municipalities, expenditure on local roads accounts 
for more than half of total expenditure- In the absence of political parties 
presenting a coalition of issues in one platform, it is unlikely that an 
elected Council would support a coalition of minority issues over the dominant 
area of municipal expenditure. The second consideration is that the 
composition of councils remains reasonably constant over time indicating that 
cyclical voting is not evident. 	If cyclical voting were present, it would 
indicate that voter preferences were not single peaked. Empirical support for 
the median voter demand model has been given by the results of authors such as 
Borcherding and Deacon (1972) and Bergstrom and Goodman (1973). 
While the median voter model may not always be stable in certain 
situations when electors vote on several issues simultaneously, it is 
considered to provide, in the Tasmanian context, a satisfactory basis for the 
examination of the demand for government goods and services. 
Finally, there are the difficulties caused by the strong information 
requirements of the electorate who must be able to assess the benefits from 
public spending and the implications for taxation. 	It will be necessary for 
the voter to separate the cost of roads from other goods and services and to 
consider the impacts of inter-governmental grants on the output of roads by 
the municipality. 
The first of these problems - the cost to the ratepayer of his 
contribution to the cost of roads - is the more easily overcome. 	Most of the 
smaller Tasmanian municipalities strike separate rates for particular goods 
and services provided. 	The need for this arises because not all services, 
for example, water and sewerage, are provided to all ratepayers. 	In larger 
municipalities, ratepayers are provided with a breakdown of municipal 
expenditure. 	The second problem, that of intergovernmental grants, may have 
the effect of expanding output. 	This is dealt with in the following section. 
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4.4 The effects of Intergovernmental Grants 
For a voter to make rational informed decisions at elections, he must 
know how much he will pay for a given amount of benefit. 	Tasmanian 
municipalities receive grants both for roads and for other goods and services. 
These grants are derived from funds provided by both State and Commonwealth 
governments and which are allocated, in the main, by the State Government. 
The effect of intergovernmental grants may be to expand output, either 
by reducing the cost of the municipal good or service or by increasing the 
quantum of funds that may be expended. The grants alter the perceived link 
between rates collected by the municipality and the goods and services 
provided. 	Thus, if there were no intergovernmental grants, then a voter 
would reasonably expect that a . 10 . per cent increase in rates would be matched 
by a 10 per cent increase in output of municipal goods and services. 
However, if municipal expenditure is partially funded from intergovernmental 
grants, then this will no longer be the case. 
This section then will examine the effect of intergovernmental grants on 
municipal expenditure. 	It will be shown that the effects of these grants 
vary, depending on whether they are matching grants or lump sum grants. 	A 
theory will be developed to show how local government expenditure is expanded 
by the effect of the two forms of grant. 
In Tasmania, local authorities receive grants for roadworks from both 
State and Commonwealth governments. 	These grants are administered by the 
(State) Department of Main Roads. 	Matching grants are provided for road 
sealing on a dollar for dollar basis. 	Lump sum grants are provided for all 
other forms of roadworks. Matching grants operate in a different way to lump 
sum grants in that they lower the tax price of the goods attracting the grant. 
Lump sum grants do not affect tax prices but make more income available to the 
community. 
4.4.1 Matching Grants 
The effect of a matching grant is shown in Figure 4.3. 	The pre-grant 
budget line is AB. The slope of the budget tine, P, is the ratio of the 
expenditures on private and on municipal goods. If the price of private goods 
is set at unity the slope of the budget line, P, is the tax price paid by the 
voter. 	This tax price is levied through the rates charged by the municipal 
council. 	The matching grant lowers the tax price to the electorate from AR 
before the grant to AE. 
It is assumed that before the matching grant is awarded, output of 
municipal goods will be G R . 	After the provision of the grant, output will be 
at C . 
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4.4.2 Lump Sum Grants 
Lump sum grants do not affect the price of local government output. 
The effect  of intergovernmental lump sum grants is shown in Figure 4.4. 
Again the pre-grant budget line is AB and this line represents the trade off 
between the individual's expenditure on private goods (income) and his 
expenditure on municipal goods. 	The provision of a lump sum grant, 
represented as a per capita measure in Figure 4.4 by AC, does not alter the 
tax price of the municipal good represented by the new budget line CD which 
also has a slope, P, assuming that the price of private goods is again set at 
unity. 
Before the grant is awarded, it is assumed output will be at G R . 	If 
the local authority maintains its expenditure on municipal goods and does not 
use the grant to reduce the level of its own taxes output, post grant will be 
at Gm . The increase in output will be the amount of the grant multiplied by 
the Fax price, P. 
It would be possible for a lump sum grant to be used either for other 
goods and services or to lower tax rates. 	In Tasmania, however, road grants 
are hypothecated for roads so that roads grants cannot be spent on other goods 
and services. 	In order to corroborate this, an examination was made of the 
accounts of all Tasmanian municipalities. 	This confirmed that no such 
transfers were made in the year under consideration. 
4.4.3 Effect of Matching and Lump Sum Grants on the Price of Municipal Goods 
The two forms of grant thus act in different ways. 	The matching grant 
increases output by lowering the tax price while a lump sum grant increases 
the income available to the municipality with which it may purchase goods. 
The reduction in tax price will be reduced by a factor equal to one 
minus the ratio of municipal expenditure supplied by matching grant to total 
municipal expenditure. 
For example Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980) propose that the marginal tax 
price for every dollar expended on a public good could be represented by $1 
per head of population. Tn this case if the ratio of matching grant to total 
expenditure by the municipality is denoted by g then the tax price for public 
goods provided by the municipality will be given by 
P = $1 ( 1-g ) 
where 	P is the tax price paid by the voter for a particular good 
N is the number of voters 
g is the ratio of matching grant to total municipal expenditure 
for that good. 
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4.5 The Distribution and Measurement of Municipal Goods and Services 
Before a model of local government expenditure can be derived two 
further issues need to be addressed. Economists working in the field of 
public choice have introduced a division in the types of goods and services 
that may be provided by government. 	Goods and services may be either public 
goods or private goods. 
Sammelson (1954) defined a public good as being such 
"that each individual's consumption leads to no subtraction from any 
other individual's consumption of that good" 
As Mueller (1979) points out 
"A pure public good is characterised by indivisibilities in production 
or jointness of supply, and the impossibility or inefficiency of excluding 
others from its consumption, once it has been supplied to some members of the 
community." 
At the local government level, many of the services provided by the 
Council are by nature private goods. 	Garbage collection, street lighting, 
drainage, water etc. would not be public goods according to either of the 
definitions above. While a trunk sewer may be available for all the houses 
in a street, it is a private good because each house must make a connection to 
the sewer so that it cannot be said to be freely available to everyone. 	On 
the other hand, roads closely approximate to a public good as all are free to 
drive along every public road in the municipality, even if they may not wish 
to. 	The exception to this case occurs where a road is congested and the use 
of the road by an additional motorist increases the costs of the other road 
users. 	In Tasmania, there are only a few instances of local government roads 
that carry sufficient volumes to suffer congestion. 	Roads that connect 
municipalities obviously confer benefits to those outside the municipality who 
are not ratepayers. 	In practice, in Tasmania there are few instances of 
roads carrying significant traffic volumes between municipalities that are not 
funded directly by the State. 	Accordingly, it has been assumed that this is 
not a significant problem in the proposed model. 
As roads are equally available to all, the cost of roads may be obtained 
by dividing total expnditure on roads by the population of the municipality. 
In the case of other "private" goods provided by the municipality, it is not 
possible to determine the incidence of their cost through the community 
because the quantity of these goods consumed will vary with each household or 
each voter. 
The implications of this in the empirical estimation of demand for 
municipal services is that the model should only include roads in the 
dependent variable. 	The independent variables would be the level of income 
of the voter and the price to him of roads. 
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The other conceptual problem to be addressed is in measuring the 
physical output of roadworks produced in a year by a municipality. 	Physical 
measures such as the extent of roadworks or the length of sealed road do not 
necesarily correlate with the municipal expenditure on roadworks. The main 
reason for this is the high proportion of maintenance works undertaken by 
local authorities on their road network. 
The cost of these maintenance works is not related to the length of road 
maintained because the work involved may vary from cleaning ditches or filling 
in potholes to the reconstruction of a failed pavement. The range in costs 
may extend from a few dollars a kilometre to tens of thousands of dollars per 
kilometre. 
Accordingly, the level of expenditure by the municipality on roads, 
including all intergovernmental grants, will be used as the measure of output 
of the municipality. 
4.6 The Model of Local Government Expenditure 
This section will develop a model of Local Government expenditure based 
on the political process and taking into account the effect of 
intergovernmental grants discussed in earlier sections. 
As this disertation is concerned with estimating the demand for local 
government roads the model will assume that the utility of the median voter 
can be measured solely in terms of two outputs, roads and the level of private 
goods. 
Suppose the utility of any voter may be expressed by a general function 
consisting of two variables: the quantity of private goods and the level of 
expenditure on municipal roads. 
U = U( Qp , OR ) 	(4.1) 
Where U is the utility of the voter 
Qp is the quantity of private goods consumed 
QRis the output of municipal roads 
Suppose further that the expenditure on private goods and on taxes (to 
pay for the roads) is equal to the income of the voter 
where 
I = QpPp 	t (4.2) 
I is the income of the voter 
p is the price of the private goods 
t is the expenditure by the voter on taxes 
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Maximise the utility function (4.1) subject to the budget constraint 
(4.2) by forming a Lagrangian 
L = U(Qp ,QR) -X( ppQp + t - I) 	(4.3) 
Examining firstly the first order conditions for private goods 
;)U -Xpp = 0 	 (4.4) 
"aQp 
Defining 	a =1 
equation (4.4) can be rewritten in the form 
41.1 - pp = 0 	 (4.5) 
ZQ, 
This result woula be expected from the conventional model of consumer 
behaviour. 
The form of the optimality condition for expenditure on municipal roads 
will depend upon the way that the municipality collects taxes. For instance 
if, as Atkinson and Stiglitz suggests such roads are funded by a uniform head 
tax then the tax paid by the individual for municipal roads can be written as 
t = 1 Qu 	 (4.6) 
N - 
where 	N is the number of ratepayers 
Substituting for t in the budget constraint (equation (4.2)) gives 
PPQP + 1 QR = I 	 (4.7) 
The Lagrangian can be rewritten as 
L = U(Qp ,QR ) 	ppQp +1QR - 1) (4.8) 
The first order condition for the output of municipal roads is 
- 	= 0 	 (4.9) 
N 
Again defining 	a = 1 
Equation (4.9) can be rewritten as 
a 	- 1 = 0 	 (4.10) 
N 
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Substituting these results into the budget constraint equation (4.7) 
gives 
g u 1 Q P I =?2p. N 
3U 
3QR 
22-PPQR 
+ QaR 
ap 
(4.11) 
Depending on the form of utility function adopted (4.11) can be solved 
and the demand equation derived. One type of model used frequently in 
empirical analysis of demand is the multiplicative demand model. In such a 
model, expenditure on municipal goods would depend on the price of municipal 
goods to the voter and the income of the voter, i.e. 
Q = CPa Ib 	 (4.12) 
Substituting for the price of roads Q = C 11 (1-g)] aIb 
	(4.13) 
(FT 
Where QRN, PR Y are defined prevously C, a, and b are coefficients to be 
estimated. 
This form of model has a number of significant advantages. In 
particular, it may be written in a linear form by taking logarithims of both 
sides 
log (Q/N) = log C + a log [1(1-g)] + b log 1 (4.14) 
The coefficients a and b are the elasticities of demand with respect to 
the price of the municipal goods and the income of the median voter. 
4.7 Discussion of the Model 
The aim of this chapter has been to develop a model of the demand for 
expenditure on Local Government roads. 	The model has a number of advantages 
over a more conventional model that would estimate physical parameters of the 
road system as a function of a number of socio-economic parameters. 
Firstly, there is an underlying theoretical justification based on the 
political process and, secondly, the model attempts to explain the annual 
expenditure on roads rather than the size of the overall network. 
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CHAPTER 5 : MODEL DATA AND ESTIMATION 
5.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter, a model of the demand for expenditure on goods 
and services provided by local authorities was derived. 	This model proposed 
that the expenditure on municipal roads was a function of the tax price of 
roads and the income of the median voter. 
The first section of this chapter will examine the sources of data used 
in the model. 	It will be shown that four data sets should be used, each 
explaining different characteristics of municipal expenditure. The final 
section will examine the data sources used for the other variables in the 
estimating equation. 
5.2 Data Sets to be used in Model Estimations 
It is proposed to use four data sets in the model estimations and to 
compare the different results obtained. The first data set comprises all 
Tasmanian municipalities. The second, third, and fourth data sets used are 
subsets of this first set of data. • 
In Chapter 3 the allocation of road funds to local authorities by both 
Commonwealth and State Governments was shown to vary according to the category 
of road. 	Local roads are classified as either urban local or rural local 
roads. 	Urban local roads comprise the majority of roads in local areas 
within the Hobart and Launceston statistical districts. 	Grants to urban and 
rural authorities are allocated in a different manner and it is hypothesised 
that this will yield different tax price elasticities. 	Accordingly, the 
second data set comprises the 34 municipalities that only receive rural local 
road grants while the third data set comprises the 15 municipalities that 
receive only urban local road grants. 
As the model only considers one type of municipal output, roads, the 
model may be expected to yield the best results when the output of the 
municipality is more exclusively devoted to the provision of roads than in 
those municipalities where roads are a relatively minor item of expenditure. 
The fourth data set, therefore, comprises the 26 municipalities which 
spend more than half their total revenue on roads and which have no other 
major output competing for expenditure. 
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5.3 Data Sources 
All the variables are established from published sources and these are 
listed in Table 5.1. 
TABLE 5.1 : DATA SOURCES 
VARIABLE 	 SOURCE 
Total expenditure on roads 	Municipal Accounts (Published in the 
Government Gazette) 
▪ Population 	 A.B.S. 
Tax Price for Roads 
• Intergovernmental road grants 
Population 
Income of Median Voter 
Municipal Association of Tasmania 
A.B.S. 
A.B.S. Census 1980/81 
deflated by CPI movement 
Income 
▪ Income of median voter 	A.B.S. Census 
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5.4 Model Estimation 
In Chapter '4 (Section 4.6) a model of local government expenditure was 
developed. 	It was proposed that expenditure by a municipality was a function 
of the product of the tax price of roads and income. In order to estimate the 
model, a demand equation of the form 
a 
—R 	= CP 	I 	See eq (4.13) 
where C a and b are the coefficients to be estimated. 	The other symbols 
have previously been defined. 
This model can be estimated using the double log form after substituting 
for the tax price of roads 
log 91p = log C + a log ri (1-g)] 
N' 	/71 
+ b log I 	(4.14) 
The model was estimated using an ordinary least squares estimator. This 
estimator has two principal assumptions. Firstly the mean of all stochastic 
disturbance terms is zero and second the stochastic disturbance terms are 
spherical. This second condition means that the distribution of the 
disturbance terms are homoscedas tic and are free from serial correlation. 
If these conditions are not met, then the ordinary least squares 
estimator will not give the best linear unbiased estimates of the model. It 
would be necessary to use a generalised least squares estimator which is 
computationally more difficult. 
In this particular model, cross sectioned data will be used, thus 
avoiding the difficulty of serial correlation. 	A statistical test will be 
performed 
(see section 5.6) to determine whether the assumption of homoscedasticity is 
valid. 
5.5 Results of Model Estimations 
The demand function was estimated using the four data sets outlined 
earlier in this chapter (Section 5.2). 
The first data set comprised all forty nine Tasmanian municipalities. 
The dependent variable used was expenditure of all Tasmanian municipalities 
for financial year 1979-80. 
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The results of this model. are given below with 't' statistics shown in 
brackets below the coefficients. 
Log Expenditure 
per head 	= 	9.059 - 0.631 log price of roads 
(2.928) 	(-9.569) 
- 0.140 Log income 
(-0.388) 
R2 0.732 F (2,46) = 62.884 
The second data set comprises the thirty four municipalities that only 
receive rural local road grants. 
The results of this model are given below with 't' statistics shown in 
brackets below the coefficients. 
Log Expenditure 	= 3.44 	- 0.466 Log price of Roads 
per head 	(0.843) 	(4.719) 
+ 0.601 Log income 
(1.233) 
Rz = 0.624 F(2,31) 	25.76 
The third data set comprises the 16 municipalities that only receive 
urban local road grants. 
Log Expenditure 	= 14.282 	- 0.725 Log price of roads 
per head 	(2.267) (-7.382) 
- 0.769 Log income 
(1.15) 
0.780 F(2,13) 27.56 
The fourth data set consists oF the twenty five municipalities which 
devote more than half their total expenditures to roads and have no other 
major competing goods or services. 
Log Expenditure 	= 	8.188 	- 0.464 Log price of roads 
per head (2.007) 	(-3.885) 
+ 0.078 Log price of private goods 
(0.161) 
RZ = 0.454 	F(2,25) 	12.25 
The coefficients estimated are the elasticities of expenditure with 
respect to tax price of roads and of other municipal goods and services. 
These are summarised in Table 5.2. 
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TABLE 5.2 : SUMMARY OF ESTIMATES OF ELASTICITY OF EXPENDITURE WITH RESPECT TO 
THE TAX PRICE OF ROADS, AND OF PRIVATE GOODS  
Elasticity of Expenditure on Roads w.r.t. 
Data Set 
  
Tax Price of Roads Income 
n.s. 
+0.601 
-0.769 
-0.079 
All Tasmanian municipalities 
M.s receiving rural local grants 
M.s receiving urban local grants 
M.s with main expenditure roads 
-0.631 
-0.466 
-0.725 
• -0.464 
n.s. denotes non-statistically significant result. 
5.6 Statistical Significance of Results 
The models all give results with a reasonable degree of statistical 
significance. 	Three measures of goodness of fit have been used, the 
coefficient of multiple correlation, students 't' test and the 'F' statistic. 
The coefficient of multiple correlation is a measure of the goodness of 
2 
fit of the model equations. 	The coefficient R 	is calculated as 
total variance - residual variance 
total variance 
In the four equations estimated, the coefficient of multiple correlation 
varied from 0.45 to 0.78 indicating a satisfactory fit of the equations. 
The 't' test determines whether the mean value of the sample is 
representative of the mean of population. 
t = Error in mean 
Standard error of mean 
In the four equations, the coefficients for the price of roads were 
greater than 99% significant. 	However, only the estimated coefficient for 
income in equation (2) was significant at the 99% level and coincidentally, of 
the correct sign. 
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The final statistical measure employed was the 'F' test. 	The 'F' test 
determines the overall goodness of fit of the regression equation by testing 
the null hypothesis that the multiple correlation in the parent population is 
zero. the four models estimated, the 'F' test shows with better than 99 
per . cent . significance that the multiple correlation of the parent population 
is not zero. 
..However, with such a large cross section data, it was considered prudent 
to test for heteroskedasticity. Heteroskedasticity-arises when the variance 
of the stochastic disturbance term is not finite and constant over the sample. 
As Intriligator (1978) notes — 
"there is typically a problem of heteroskedasticity in 
cross section studies in which there is a large variation 
in the size of the entities for which data are obtained" 
The presence of heteroskedasticity will cause two difficulties. 
Firstly, the least squares estimates will no longer be efficient although 
still linear and unbiased. 	Secondly, the estimated variances of the least . 
squares estimators will be biased so that the usual tests of significance such 
as the 't' and 'F' tests noted earlier will be invalid. 
Glejser (1969) suggests a test for homoskedasticity which involves 
regressing the absolute value of the residuals obtained in the model 
estimation with an appronriate model variable. 	Tn this case it is considered 
that the variable most likely to exhibit scedastic behaviour would he the 
dependent variable. 	nlejser specifies the disturbance term of the model as a 
polynomial of order g. 	In practice the order of the polynomial would not 
exceed two and so Gleiser proposes a regression equation of the form 
U = a + bZ + e 
where u is disturbance of the estimated model 
Z is a variable in the estimated model that may exhibit scedasticity 
a and b are regression coefficients 
e is the residual 
This equation was estimated for the overall model containing all 
municipalities 
u = 1.448 — 0.00857 expenditure per head of population on roads 
(1.710) 
R2=0.0586 	F(1,47)=2.922 
The estimated coefficient for the potentially sceAastic variable was not 
significantly different from zero. 	Accordingly, it is concluded that the 
disturbances in the estimated model are homoscedastic. 
The absence of heteroskedasticity and serial correlation means that the 
disturbances of the estimated model are spherical and hence the use of 
ordinary least squares estimator is justified. 
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CHAPTER 6 : DISCUSSION OF RESULTS OF MODEL ESTIMATION 
■ 6.1 Introduction 
This chapter . will . examine the results of the model estimations 
presented in the previous chapter in three ways. 	The first will examine the 
assumptions implicit in the model which were described in section 4.3. 	The 
second section of the chapter will compare the results of the model 
estimations with other published work in this field. 	Almost all of this work 
has been undertaken on expenditure of State Governments or Local Governments 
in the H.S..covering a wide range of State and municipal expenditure. 
Finally, the implications for expenditure on local roads in Tasmania will be 
evaluated. 
6.2 The Multiplicity of Voter Choice Decisions 
Section 4.2 discussed at some length the assumptions that are implicit 
in the median voter model. 	Some of the difficulties such as voter abstention 
may be treated theoretically with a reasonable degree of satisfaction. 
However, there is one particular problem that arises from the multiplicity of 
choice decisions facing the electorate that could cause instability in the 
estimation. 	This may occur if a candidate who presents a policy platform of 
extreme positions gains the support of minorities in sufficient quantity to 
defeat a candidate who adopts a median position on all issues. 
The model estimations undertaken employed four data sets explicitly to 
investigate this problem. 	One of the data sets consisted of twenty four 
rural Tasmanian municipalities where expenditure represented over fifty per 
cent of municipal expenditure and there are no significant competing 
expenditures. 	It would be unlikely that a candidate who offered a policy 
position that was significantly different to that of the median voter in these 
municipalities where a single •issue predominates, would be successful in 
gaining election. 
It would be expected that the statistical fit of the model estimation 
using this subset of Tasmanian municipalities might be better than that of the 
model employing all Tasmanian municipalities in its estimation table if voters 
habitually vote in other municipalities for those candidates presenting a 
coalition of minority positions. However, it can be seen from the results of 
the models reported in section 5.6 that this model gave a rather worse fit 
than the other three models. 
This does not conclusively prove that in local elections the Council 
necessarily reflects the views of the median voter. 	It may mean that in 
small muncipalities other factors such as preferences for individual 
candidates may outweigh the policies that they represent. 
6.3 Comparison with Results of Other Median Voter Models 
There have been a number of attempts to use the median voter model to 
analyse the expenditure behaviour of government. 	Barr and Downs (1966) and 
Davis and Haines (1966) were among the first to undertake empirical research 
in this field. 	Later and more sophisticated models were estimated by 
Borcherding and Deacon (1972), Bergstrom and Goodman (1973), Peterson 
(1973,1975), Clotfelter (1976), Pommerhne and Frey (1976), Deacon (1978) and 
Pommerehne (1978). 
• 	Peterson 444 Clotfelter were concerned with levels of funding for 
schools. 	In . America, schools are governed by Schools Boards which are 
elected... Pommerehne was concerned with electoral decisions of referenda held 
in  Switzerland. 	It is considered that these papers represent a different 
electoral . system . to . that . being considered in Tasmania. Borcherding and 
Deacon, Bergstrom and Goodman, and Deacon are all reporting on electoral 
decisions in the United States where a large range of policies were being 
voted upon. - 
.Borcherding and Deacon estimated a Cobb Douglas demand model using cross 
section data grouped so as to compare those States with a constant labour 
share for each good or service provided.. Their model estimated per capita 
expenditure as a function of the physical output of the good under 
consideration, the wage rate and labour share of that output and the income of 
the mean voter. Unfortunately, the results of the estimations of the price 
elasticity of highways were uniformly insignificant. 
Bergstrom and Goodman were concerned with estimating local government 
expenditure by a median voter model. 	Their data set consisted of 826 
municipalities located in ten States with population of between 10,000 and 
150,000. 	Expenditure was estimated as a function of the population of the 
municipality, the median income and the tax share of the citizen with the 
median income. 	Bergstrom and Goodman estimated models for three different 
local government outputs, general expenditure (excluding education and 
welfare), police, and parks and recreation. 	They reported elasticities of 
expenditure with respect to tax share for all goods and services (excluding 
education and welfare) ranging from - 0.13 to - 0.50. 	However, they were 
less successful with other types of municipal output and were only 
infrequently able to determine significant coefficients. 
Deacon's model was rather different in its scope and aims. 	Deacon was 
concerned with possible substitution effects in public consumption. 	The 
knowledge of these effects would enable estimates of the shift in budget 
allocations between categories of public expenditure that might result from an 
increase or decrease in costs of specific services. 
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In contrast to Bergstrom and Goodman, and to Borcherding and Deacon, 
Deacon used a fifty year time series of six categories of public expenditure 
In Seattle. 	The model estimated price and expenditure elasticities for six 
services provided by the city. 	The expenditure elasticities were similar to 
ordinary income elasticities of demand except that income was replaced by 
aggregate public sector expenditure. 
• The results of the model are not directly comparable with those of the 
two earlier writers discussed above because of the use of time series as 
opposed to cross section data. 	However, Deacon found that all goods and 
services provided by the City were inelastic. 	He further found that the 
expenditure elasticities, except in one case, were unitary. 	Thus, expansion 
paths for each service could be regarded as a ray emanating from the origin. 
The results of the three models discussed in this section are 
reproduced in Table 6.1. 	The results of the model developed in Chapter 4, 
which are reported in Table 5.2, are comparable in magnitude with those of 
other writers. 	Clearly the elasticities presented are compensated 
elasticities while those of Borcherding and Deacon and Bergstrom and Goodman 
are ordinary elasticities. 	While Deacon reports compensated elasticities, 
these have been obtained using time series estimation and hence would be 
expected to be somewhat lower than those estimated from cross section data. 
6.4 Implications of Results on Municipal Expenditures 
The estimated elasticities from the models show that the provision of 
roads is quite price elastic. 
Fisher(1982) discussed the effect of lump sum grants on municipal 
expenditure. 	He discussed the effect noted in the literature that lump sum 
grants increase local government expenditures more than equivalent increases 
in private income. This is known as the flypaper effect because grants for 
public expenditure "stick" . to . public output. 	Fisher considers that there may 
be two causes for this behaviour. 
The first is that Councils spend grants because they incur no political 
cost in collecting that revenue. 	The alternative view is that while grants 
are perceived as lump sum grants, they have substantial price effects. 	For 
example, Fisher quotes from Chernick (1979) who proposes a model where 
bureaucrats allocate grants to maximise their own utility which is a function 
of resulting public output. 	Chernick envisages negotiation between grantor 
and recipient about the conditions for the project. 
In both these views, the more price elastic public outputs would receive 
larger grants as this produces the most output at the least cost. 	This 
result has strong implications for central government. If it is desired to 
stimulate expenditure at the municipal level by making grants, then lowering 
the tax price of urban roads may he more stimulatory than providing grants to 
rural roads. 
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TABLE 6.1 : COMPARISON OF ESTIMATED ELASTICITIES OF EXPENDITURE wrt tax price 
Author(s) 
Borcherding 
Municipal Good Estimates of Elasticity 
wrt Price 
and Deacon Highways Group 2 -0.1752 (n.s.) 
Highways Group 1 0.5864 (n.s.) 
Parks and Recreation -0.4958 (n.s.) 
Bergstrom 
and Goodman General Expenditure -0.23 
Parks and Recreation -0.19 
Deacon Parks 0.4535 
Administration -0.4209 
Model Estimates Roads -0.767 
42 
CHAPTER 7 
SUMMARY 
This dissertation has attempted to examine the demand for roads provided 
by local government in Tasmania. 	It was found that there were considerable 
difficulties involved in the development of a suitable model with which to 
estimate the demand for a product that is not freely bought or sold in the 
market place. 	Accordingly, the model that is developed is based on the 
political process in as much that it assumed that the municipal councils are 
assumed to maximise the utility of the electorate. 
The development of models based on the democratic process dates back to 
Wicksell in the last century. 	The democratic process has attracted the 
attention of many of this century's foremost economists and notable 
contributors include Hotelling, Arrow, Downes, Black, Baumol and Stigler. 
Economic models based on the actions of the median voter were particularly 
developed in the past decade. 	However, no application of such models to 
local road expenditures in Australia has been undertaken. 
The basic principle underlying the median voter model of the democratic 
process is that the demands of the electorate may be represented by the 
demands of the median voter who is assumed to cast the decisive vote at an 
election. 	A complementary requirement is the need for candidates to vary 
their policies to conform to the wishes of the electorate. 
This form of model is well suited to an examination of the political 
process in Tasmania. 	Municipal councils are elected on a rotating basis so 
that there are elections every year. 	Municipalities are, in the main, small. 
Only twelve of the forty nine have populations of over 10,000 and, in nearly 
half the electorates, expenditure on roads accounts for over half of total 
expenditure and expenditures on other services is only minor. 	Finally, there 
are no party politics in local governments in Tasmania. 
The conventional median voter model described in Chapter 4 needs some 
amendment to take into account the effects of intergovernmental grants. 	The 
provision of matching grants was shown to effectively reduce the apparent 
price of municipal goods that are beneficiaries. 	A further extension to the 
conventional model is needed because of the difficulty involved in measuring 
the output of municipal roads. 	The solution to this latter problem was the 
adoption of expenditure as a measure of output. 
The fully developed model consists of a demand function which seeks to 
measure the demand by the median voter for roads provided by the municipality 
in terms of the tax price of roads and the income of the voter. 
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Four models were estimated. 	The first comprised a cross section data 
set of all Tasmanian municipalities. 	Cross section data was used because it 
is assumed that at elections the electorate is concerned only with the 
. situation in the future and that the voter and the candidates cannot be 
involved in an interrelationship over a series of elections. 
The second and third models included only those municipalities which 
receive rural and urban road grants respectively. These grants are allocated 
by the State Department of Main Roads according to formulae which differ 
depending on whether the road is urban or rural. 
The fourth data set comprises twenty four of the smaller Tasmanian 
municipalities where expenditure on roads accounts for over half of total 
expenditure. 	This particular setof data also provided a means to test the 
assumption that the candidate representing the position of the median voter 
would be elected. 	In these municipalities the electorate are essentially 
faced with a number of candidates offering views about the level of 
expenditure on only one category of municipal output. 	This should minimise 
the possibility for candidates representing extreme views attracting support 
from a coalition of minority interests. 
• 
The estimated models provided very satisfactory results both in the 
plausibility of the estimated coefficients and in their statistical 
significance. 
The model estimations showed three main results. 	Firstly, while the 
assumption that the median voter model represented voter behaviour could not 
be clearly proved there was a very good statistical fit for each of the 
equations estimated. 	The model equation, which employed the set of data 
comprising solely those municipalities where expenditure on roads dominated 
all others, did not perform in a manner that was significantly better in a 
statistical sense as might have been expected. 
The second result of the model was that the estimations were comparable 
in magnitude to those found by other writers who estimated demand elasticities 
for local and State government services in the United States. 
The third result was that the tax price elasticity of roads is higher in 
urban rather than rural municipalities. This may show that roads are a more 
essential municipal output in rural areas reflecting their much higher share 
of municipal expenditure. 
The aim of this dissertation has been to estimate the demand for local 
government roads in terms of the cost of their provision. 	While the basic 
premise of the dissertation has been fulfilled, the model could also be 
extended to consider the interaction between grants, municipal taxes, and 
output of municipal goods through the simultaneous estimation of tax rate and 
production of municipal goods. 
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